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THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN 
O’BANNON AND THE FALLACY OF  
FRAGILE DEMAND  
ANDY SCHWARZ* & RICHARD J. VOLANTE** 
 
 
First of all, under the Rule of Reason, in this Court and in the 
Supreme Court, to be valid, a restraint need only be  
reasonably necessary to achieve the pro-competitive ends.   
So . . .  the question is whether the NCAA’s rule of no pay for 
play—none—is so inconsistent with its objective of  
preserving amateur athletics that it violates the Rule  
[of Reason].1 
 
With these words, NCAA counsel Seth Waxman succeeded in diverting the 
Ninth Circuit majority in O’Bannon v. NCAA2 from its actual task,  
enforcing the antitrust laws.  Instead, after having determined the NCAA was a 
cartel in restraint of trade and liable under the Sherman Act,3 the court chose to 
take on the role of the enforcement arm of the NCAA, focused on  
preserving amateurism rather than preserving competition.   
This error was not lost on the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit Judge  
Sidney Thomas who explained in dissent 
                                                          
* Andy Schwarz (@andyhre on Twitter) is an antitrust economist and partner at OSKR, an economic 
consulting firm specializing in expert witness testimony.  He managed the economic research for De-
fendants in Raiders v. NFL and for Plaintiffs in O’Bannon v. NCAA. 
** Richard J. Volante, Esq. (@EssexAce13 on Twitter) is a sports and entertainment agent and 
consultant at Sixth City Sports & Entertainment, LLC, a consultation and representation firm. Addi-
tionally, Ricky is admitted to the Ohio Bar and recently co-founded Victor & Volante, Co., a firm that 
focuses on sports and entertainment law. 
1. Oral Argument at 16:05, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (No.  
14-16601), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000007396. 
2. O’Bannon,  802 F.3d at 1076 (“But in finding that paying students cash compensation would 
promote amateurism as effectively as not paying them, the district court ignored that not paying  
student-athletes is precisely what makes them amateurs.”). 
3. Id. at 1079 (“Today, we reaffirm that NCAA regulations are subject to antitrust scrutiny and must 
be tested in the crucible of the Rule of Reason. . . . In this case, the NCAA’s rules have been more 
restrictive than necessary to maintain its tradition of amateurism in support of the college sports  
market.”). 
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The majority characterizes our task at step three of the Rule of 
Reason as determining “whether the alternative of allowing  
students to be paid NIL compensation unrelated to their  
education expenses is ‘virtually as effective’ in preserving  
amateurism as not allowing compensation.”  This conclusion 
misstates our inquiry. Rather, we must determine whether  
allowing student-athletes to be compensated for their NILs is 
‘virtually as effective’ in preserving popular demand for  
college sports as not allowing compensation. In terms of  
antitrust analysis, the concept of amateurism is relevant only 
insofar as it relates to consumer interest.4 
 
This confusion—between restraints that promote “amateurism” and those 
that promote competition by allowing a product to exist at all, particularly one 
that meets consumer demand but could not exist without the restraint—is at the 
heart of the NCAA’s now sixty years of successful price fixing (dating back to 
1956).  These efforts were, ironically, given a substantial boost when the NCAA 
lost the NCAA v. Board of Regents5 case (the first of a trilogy of cases that found 
the NCAA to be an anticompetitive price-fixing cartel6).  In essence, the NCAA 
argues (without a proffer of market-based evidence) that amateurism is unable 
to stand on its own in the marketplace and that rules that provide for collective 
punishments, including full-on boycotts, are necessary for the product to exist, 
and therefore the specific rules that define amateurism are immune from  
antitrust scrutiny.  What matters, argues the NCAA, as to the legality of a  
particular restraint is not whether it provides a sine qua non without which  
college sports (or even amateur college sports) could not exist, but rather 
whether the rule in suit is a reasonable ancillary restraint to preserve, not  
competition or even the product in question, but amateurism itself, as the NCAA 
defines (and continually redefines) it. 
Neither this confusion nor efforts to bring it into the light as a  
sophisticated but sophistic ruse is new.  In 2000, Rascher and Schwarz explained 
 
There is a subtlety here that seems to have been missed by  
later interpreters of NCAA v. Board of Regents. In essence, the 
                                                          
4. Id. at 1081 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). NIL stands for name, image, and likeness. 
Id. at 1055. 
5. See generally NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
6. The other two being O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049 and Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 
1998). 
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NCAA Court said one thing: academic affiliation is what  
differentiates NCAA football from NFL football, and thus  
creates a market—i.e., this differentiation is procompetitive. 
The Court then went on to assume that a particular restraint 
used to achieve that differentiation—amateurism—is both  
reasonable and necessary. In NCAA, there was no need to  
determine if amateurism was actually a reasonable and  
necessary restraint; the Court merely sought to highlight the 
comparative lack of justification for the NCAA’s TV  
restraints.  
 
However, in later cases, particularly McCormack v. NCAA, 
Gaines v. NCAA, and Banks v. NCAA, the courts have used 
NCAA v. Board of Regents as a starting point, reading  
Supreme Court dicta as evidence that amateurism itself has 
passed the reasonableness test, moving forward to evaluate  
specific follow-on rules designed to support amateurism.  
These cases analyze whether the NCAA’s rules are reasonable 
and necessary for preserving amateurism, not if amateurism it-
self is reasonable and necessary. Since NCAA did not perform 
this formal analysis (because this question did not apply to the 
matter at hand), it remains an open issue for the courts.7 
 
As a simple example of this difference, consider the so-called Sanity Code, 
by which the NCAA banned all scholarship aid in 1948 in the name of  
amateurism.  Under a proper Rule of Reason analysis (had one been performed 
prior to the restraint collapsing through schools’ refusal to enforce the  
collective boycotts),8 the question would be whether a strict and blanket  
prohibition on all form of scholarship aid whatsoever9 was necessary to  
produce college sports.  Almost certainly such an answer would have been (and 
would still be) no, as no such rule existed during the rise of college  
football as a popular sport (far more popular than the NFL prior to World War 
                                                          
7. Daniel A. Rascher & Andrew D. Schwarz, Neither Reasonable Nor Necessary: “Amateurism” 
in Big-Time College Sports, ANTITRUST, Spring 2000, at 51 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
8. Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust  
Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 332–34 (2007) (noting that the Sanity Code only existed for  
approximately two years before being abandoned and eventually replaced by a form of the NCAA’s 
current bylaws). 
9. Gary T. Brown, NCAA Answers Call to Reform: The ‘Sanity Code’ Leads Association down Path 
to Enforcement Program, NCAA.ORG (Nov. 22, 1999), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsAr-
chive/1999/19991122/active/3624n24.html. 
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II10).  However, from the NCAA’s position, the question is not whether “sanity” 
was needed to produce college sports, but whether “sanity” was a reasonably 
necessary means of ensuring that amateurism existed, regardless of whether  
amateurism itself was necessary to produce college sports. 
From the perspective of 2015, with the Sanity Code gone for over sixty 
years, it may seem ludicrous that a court might be asked to rule in favor of a 
restraint prohibiting all scholarship aid, under the theory that if the NCAA feels 
it is necessary to preserve amateurism, no further inquiry is needed.   
Ludicrous or not, the NCAA in fact did ask the Ninth Circuit to rule as such, as 
argued again by Counsel Seth Waxman:  
 
As a thought exercise, think of what would happen, let’s  
assume . . . the NCAA goes back and says . . . we are simply 
going to require the Division-III model or the Ivy League model 
of all schools.  That is, students get in, we can try to recruit 
athletes, but no one gets any athletic scholarships.  You get 
scholarships based on need, if the school has sufficient  
resources to provide it. Under the Plaintiffs’ theory in this case 
and I think under the district judge’s rationale that would be a 
violation of the antitrust laws . . . The point is, that this is a 
product, it’s again, I think no one would contend, that if the 
NCAA just decided that we’re not going to offer athletic  
scholarships, which is the rule that existed in 1906 when the 
rules were first permitted, and instead we’re simply going to 
endorse the rules that we have for Division III, that that would 
be a violation of the antitrust laws.11  
 
To those aware of this dichotomy between truly procompetitive restraints 
that preserve competition and seemingly unjustified restraints that merely  
perpetuate the abuse of monopsony power under the guise of amateurism, 
O’Bannon provided an ideal testing ground for whether the antitrust laws would 
function to protect competition or to preserve the NCAA’s cartel power. 
The result of this test, to date, is incomplete.12  The Ninth Circuit majority 
                                                          
10. The quick rise in popularity of the NFL can be traced back to the 1958 NFL Championship 
Game between the Baltimore Colts and New York Giants, which led to the league quickly surpassing 
college football in terms of national popularity. See MICHAEL MACCAMBRIDGE, AMERICA’S GAME: 
THE EPIC STORY OF HOW PRO FOOTBALL CAPTURED A NATION ix–xix (2004).  Perhaps not  
coincidentally, this rise coincided in time with the first period of NCAA enforcement of amateurism 
that began in 1956.   
11. Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 7:31. 
12. Indeed, while this Article was in final proofs, both the O’Bannon Plaintiffs and the NCAA have 
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(with agreement on this point by the dissent) found that the challenged NCAA 
rules were “patently and inexplicably stricter than is necessary to accomplish all 
of its procompetitive objectives”13 and therefore upheld the district court’s  
ruling that “the NCAA’s amateurism rules . . . were an illegal restraint of trade 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.”14  However, the majority of the 
court stopped short of allowing the NCAA’s amateurism rules to fall by the  
wayside, arguing “that it is a ‘self-evident fact’ that ‘[t]he difference between 
offering student-athletes education-related compensation and offering them 
cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not minor; it is a quantum 
leap.’”15  In essence, the majority appears to have decided that consumers will 
not purchase college sports if they are seen as non-amateur.16  No evidence was 
presented for this claim, and as the dissent pointed out, much evidence to the 
contrary was first declared inapt or explained away by the majority before it 
could declare these truths to be self-evident.17 
In contrast to this muddy legal picture, the economics are quite clear.  
Underpinning the application of the Rule of Reason to team sports is the  
simple truism that it takes more than one team to field a competitive sport  
contest.18  Once coordination between two teams, likely economic competitors 
off-the-field (in some markets), is recognized as necessary for those teams to 
become sports competitors on-the-field, the normal legal standard against  
agreements among competitors to regulate output clearly must be modified for 
sports.19  The result was a series of cases, primarily in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
recognizing that per se bans on restraints governing sports franchises risk  
banning procompetitive conduct.20  Thus, the actual holding of NCAA v. Board 
of Regents (as opposed to the now rejected reading of its amateurism dicta) 
stood for the idea that the Rule of Reason was a more appropriate standard for  
                                                          
appealed to the Supreme Court.  
13. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015). 
14. Id. at 1055–56. 
15. Id. at 1081 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration in original). 
16. Id. at 1078–79. 
17. See id. at 1080–83 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Ninth Circuit cases 
comprised 25.7% of all Supreme Court cases during the last four terms and were overturned 79.5% of 
the time. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students (Sponsored by Bloomberg Law): Scoring the 
Circuits, SCOTUSBLOG (June 22, 2014, 10:28 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/scotus-for-
law-students-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-scoring-the-circuits/. 
18. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL (Raiders I), 726 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th Cir. 1984)  
(stating a per se rule was inappropriate due to “the unique nature of the business of professional  
football.”). 
19. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010). 
20. See, e.g., Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 671–72 (7th Cir. 1992); Raiders I, 726 
F.2d 1381, 1387; McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 897 (D. Minn. 1992). 
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assessing whether agreements among universities as to the details of how they 
produce college sports than would be a per se prohibition of all discussion of 
price or output.  But despite this recognition, the major sports leagues (with the 
obvious exception of baseball)21 as well as college sports have all been found 
liable for violations of the Sherman Act under the Rule of Reason.  Particularly 
with respect to conduct as it relates to fixing the price of talent, cases like  
Robertson v. NBA,22 McNeil v. NFL,23 and Law v. NCAA24 firmly established 
that collective restraints on pay, when imposed outside of a valid collective  
bargaining framework, are illegal restraints of trade, even under the Rule of 
Reason standard. 
An important economic grounding for why such a legal framework makes 
sense is the idea that prices in a specialized labor market are typically set, not 
by supply and cost factors but rather by demand factors.  That is because the 
cost to produce a football player or even an assistant coach is fairly low relative 
to the competitive wage an athlete or coach can earn and is usually substantially 
higher than the athlete or coach’s second-best wage offer outside of sports.  As 
a matter of economics, it is clear that what is driving up the price of talent is 
demand. 
This boils down to a simple first year undergraduate economic concept, 
namely the difference between movement along a demand curve, caused by a 
change in the cost of supply, versus movement of a demand curve, caused by 
the increased value of the product to its purchasers.  The former has the potential 
to cause reduction in output—as prices rise for factors unrelated to demand, the 
least valuable product may find itself without a buyer willing to pay its now 
higher price.   
                                                          
21. [T]his Court held that the business of providing public baseball games for profit between clubs 
of professional baseball players was not within the scope of federal antitrust laws. Congress has had 
the ruling under consideration but has not seen fit to bring such business under these laws by  
legislation having prospective effect.  
Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (referring to Justice Holmes’s 1922 majority 
opinion in Federal Baseball Club of Balt.  v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 
200 (1922)).  See generally City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 776 F.3d 686 (2015), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 36 (2015) (upholding MLB’s antitrust exemption). 
22. Robertson v. NBA, 556 F.2d 682, 686 n.5 (2d Cir. 1977) (establishing free agency in the NBA, 
with the court stating that the non-statutory labor exemption, or CBA exemption, did not apply to  
unilateral employer actions, but rather only joint actions of the employers and union). 
23. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 888–89 (finding Plan B free agency to be more restrictive than  
necessary after it failed two of the three Mackey test prongs and thereby not protected under the  
non-statutory labor exemption, which led to a settlement with the league creating a salary cap and free 
agency in the NFL). 
24. See generally Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).  The Tenth Circuit determined 
the restricted earning coaches cap violated antitrust law and was not exempted by Board of Regents.  
Id. at 1018–19. 
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Increase in Cost Leads to a Shift in Supply, Raising Price While  
Lowering Quantity 
 
But the latter, a situation in which demand itself drives up price, the idea 
that purchasers will find these new prices unaffordable is economic nonsense—
the prices have risen only because consumer demand has grown.  The result, 
eminently natural to economists but seemingly contradictory to some lay folk, 
is one in which price and output rise. 
 
Price
PNew
POld
Quantity
Original Supply Curve
Higher-Cost Supply Curve
QNew QOld
Demand Curve
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Increased Consumer Interest Leads to a Shift in Demand, 
Raising Price and Quantity 
 
What sort of economic phenomenon would involve an increase in  
demand?  Imagine a wonderful world in which cinnamon powdered donuts were 
found to have cancer-fighting properties, so that instead of chemotherapy,  
certain cancers could be treated with a daily dose of donuts—and moreover, 
sufficient proactive donut consumption could stop cancer before it starts.  One 
can easily see that the desire of consumers to purchase donuts would rise, even 
in the face of a price increase, simply because as wonderful as these little  
powdered gems may be today, adding in the additional benefit of curing cancer 
would surely grow their popularity.25 
This effect is similar to what happens when artificially capped demand is 
set free (e.g., by ending collusion).  Price rises, not because the cost of supply 
changed, but because effective demand has grown. 
With this in mind, it should be clear that rational sports franchises really 
cannot drive up the price of talent to the point where no one can afford to  
purchase it.  Even if, for example, the richest team in the NFL wants to pay its 
head coach $50 million per year, the ability for that price to drive the price of 
                                                          
25. One of the Authors is currently on a strict no-sugar diet, which may be responsible for the paean 
to cinnamon donuts above. 
Price
PNew
POld
Quantity
Higher Demand Curve
QNewQOld
Original Demand Curve
Supply Curve
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Compensation to Athletes
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the thirty-second coach to the point that the thirty-second team cannot afford his 
salary would require some other source of demand for that coach’s services.   
Into this basic economic framework comes the NCAA’s idea that if athletes 
are allowed to be paid a market price, the product of college sports would cease 
to exist.  Clearly, economically, this idea is false.  At a basic level, if demand 
(D) for college sports is a function of the level of payment (w) and level of 
quality (q), that is, 𝐷 = 𝑓(𝑤, 𝑞), and if that function is decreasing for values of 
w above some magical threshold w*, that is, 
𝑑𝐷(𝑤,𝑞)
𝑑𝑤
<0 for w>w*, then payments 
above the optimal level of wage will be prevented organically, by the simple 
fact that rational firms do not voluntarily undertake demand-decreasing  
purchases.   
Such a market would have a relationship between compensation and  
consumer demand that followed the following schedule, where demand grows 
as compensation increases (from D-III in which athletes themselves pay to play, 
through D-II and FCS football) to the point of supposed maximum  
popularity, the FBS limits, after which, according to the NCAA, demand would 
begin to decline:  
 
Going beyond this point requires costly investments that yield negative  
returns.  Only an irrational or incompetent firm would take such steps.  Thus no 
collective action would be needed to prevent an NFL team from installing sharp 
spikes on every seat in its stadium—the process would increase costs and at the 
same time decrease attendance.  If payments to athletes above some level are 
demand decreasing, they would be as likely to happen absent a government 
mandate as a costly spike-installation process. 
This is the economic fallacy behind the Ninth Circuit majority’s opinion in 
O’Bannon.  The Ninth Circuit explained: 
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The difference between offering student-athletes  
education-related compensation and offering them cash sums 
untethered to educational expenses is not minor; it is a quantum 
leap. Once that line is crossed, we see no basis for returning to 
a rule of amateurism and no defined stopping point; we have 
little doubt that plaintiffs will continue to challenge the  
arbitrary limit imposed by the district court until they have  
captured the full value of their NIL. At that point the NCAA 
will have surrendered its amateurism principles entirely and 
transitioned from its “particular brand of football” to minor 
league status. In light of that, the meager evidence in the record, 
and the Supreme Court’s admonition that we must afford the 
NCAA “ample latitude” to superintend college athletics, we 
think it is clear the district court erred in concluding that small 
payments in deferred compensation are a substantially less  
restrictive alternative restraint. We thus vacate that portion of 
the district court’s decision and the portion of its injunction  
requiring the NCAA to allow its member schools to pay this 
deferred compensation.26 
 
Under the Rule of Reason, if there is “no basis” for payments to stop at 
some arbitrary level that defines amateurism, but instead consumer demand will 
drive teams to pay athletes “until they have captured the full value of their 
NIL,”27 then, as a matter of economics, any arbitrary limit is inherently  
unnecessary.  Rather than laying out an argument for why a strict, collectively 
enforced rule defining amateurism was necessary to preserve consumer  
demand, the majority in O’Bannon expressed a fear that consumer demand 
would prove rules enforcing NCAA-style amateurism were themselves  
unnecessary.28  After all, what industry in the history of American business has 
ever voluntarily incurred higher costs with the known goal of lowering  
consumers’ evaluation of the product’s quality?  The very idea that athletes have 
a full value of their NIL that is currently being denied to them is evidence that 
the restraint of cost of attendance (COA) is too low, because that full value is 
only set in the context of consumer demand.  If 
𝑑𝐷(𝑤,𝑞)
𝑑𝑤
<0 at w=COA, then there 
is no risk of pay rising higher in a less constrained market.  On the contrary, if 
𝑑𝐷(𝑤,𝑞)
𝑑𝑤
>0 at w=COA, then if left unconstrained, pay will rise to the full value 
                                                          
26. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2015) (footnotes omitted) (citations  
omitted) (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101–02, 120 (1984)). 
27. Id.  
28. See id. 
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of NIL and consumer demand will be enhanced.   
 
 
 
Just as in the examples above, if payment rises for reasons driven by  
demand, rules designed to restrain that increase are almost certainly  
anticompetitive as a matter of economics. 
Recall that the majority found the NCAA’s actual rule, which limited  
scholarships to what was then known as a Full Grant-in-Aid (GIA) (several 
thousand dollars below full COA)29 were “more restrictive than necessary”30 
and thus violated the Sherman Act.  But, argued the majority, the COA line 
could not be crossed without making a “quantum leap.”31  Of course, in 1948, 
the NCAA argued this quantum leap was at $1 in aid, not at COA.  And in 2006, 
when sued over COA issues in White v. NCAA, the NCAA argued that a rule 
allowing schools to pay the full COA for athletic aid was itself on the wrong 
side of the quantum leap line.32  The idea that (a) the next dollar  
                                                          
29. Each university independently determines the list price of the components of a Full GIA as well 
as its official COA values. Jon Solomon, 2015-16 CBS Sports FBS College Football Cost of  
Attendance Database, CBSSPORTS (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefoot-
ball/writer/jon-solomon/25275374/-16-cbs-sports-fbs-college-football-cost-of-attendance-database. 
For example, Alabama is able to offer up to $5,386 in addition to the traditional elements of a GIA 
(room, board, books, tuition, and fees), while Ohio State is only able to offer up to $2,970.  Id. 
30. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075, 1079 (stating “[t]o the contrary, the evidence at trial showed that 
the grant-in-aid cap has no relation whatsoever to the procompetitive purposes of the NCAA: by the 
NCAA’s own standards, student-athletes remain amateurs as long as any money paid to them goes to 
cover legitimate educational expenses.”). 
31. See id. at 1078. 
32. In October 2007, the NCAA argued prohibiting COA was necessary to “prevent ‘pay-for-play’; 
ensure that student-athletes are students first; protect the NCAA’s unique, amateur model of  
competition for the benefit of consumers and student-athletes.”  See NCAA’s Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, at 
40, White v. NCAA, No. CV 06–0999–RGK (MANx), 2006 WL 8066803 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2007).  
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beyond COA would destroy demand and that (b) schools would knowingly 
make that quantum leap remains an untested assumption.33  As the dissent in 
O’Bannon explained, “After an extensive bench trial, the district court made a 
factual finding that payment of $5,000 in deferred compensation would not  
significantly reduce consumer demand for college sports. This finding was  
supported by extensive testimony from at least four expert witnesses. There was 
no evidence to the contrary.”34  
However, purely arguendo, suppose the majority in the Ninth Circuit has 
sua sponte unearthed some magical property of demand that applies to college 
sports and to no other market, which is that as long as consumers feel someone 
is minding the store to ensure “sanity” or amateurism, consumer demand is safe, 
but that if consumers feel some school is cheating, then the entire system will 
collapse.  Surely then, one might ask whether the NCAA must step in to prevent 
schools from crossing that mystical line of demarcation, beyond which market 
collapse looms?  That is, 
𝑑𝐷(𝑤,𝑞)
𝑑𝑤
>0 for all w<=COA, and then there is some  
as-yet-unproven discontinuity, such that  𝐷(𝑤, 𝑞) = 0 for all w > COA. 
Though a demand curve like this sounds somewhat improbable, there are 
consumer markets in which bad apples can spoil the whole bunch.  For example, 
consider the market for organic fruit, in which organic apples, which cost more 
to produce and may look somewhat less appealing on the shelf, are nevertheless 
in high demand by a segment of consumers, and where that demand will drop 
to close to zero if the apples are produced non-organically.  In the absence of 
some form of market regulation, there is little to stop an unscrupulous apple 
orchard from using pesticides and other tools of the non-organic trade, but  
labeling the resulting product as “organic” simply to tap into the higher  
consumer demand that such a sticker can drive.  Much like the market for used 
cars in which lemons35 drive out quality cars,36 cheaper faux-ganic fruit can 
                                                          
They had previously argued that “the NCAA will explain during summary judgment briefing why 
Plaintiffs’ proposed ‘COA cap’ is not a viable, let alone less restrictive, means of achieving the pro-
competitive benefits that the NCAA’s current financial aid rules provide.”  Defendant NCAA’s Reply 
in Support of Its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, at 7–8, n.9, White v. NCAA, No. CV 06–0999–
RGK (MANx), 2006 WL 8066803 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2007).  While White ultimately settled, the settle-
ment (Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Defendant National Collegiate 
Athletic Association, White v. NCAA, Case No. 2:06-cv-00999, 2008 WL 890625 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 28, 
2008)) did not include any change in the NCAA’s maximum GIA rules, and thus COA remained pro-
hibited until 2015. 
33. Mark Emmert, the president of the NCAA, stated, “If we move toward a pay-for-play model – 
if we were to convert our student-athletes to employees of the university – that would be the death of 
college athletics.”  Joe Nocera, Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-college-athletes.html. 
34. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1083 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
35. Apologies for having created a fruit salad of mixed metaphors. 
36. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the  
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drive out truly organic fruit and leave consumers worse off. 
Organic fruit can be thought of as a form of amateurism—although  
perhaps not produced to the same level of mainstream, commercially defined 
quality as other fruit—one for which the specific characteristics that make it 
organic are essential to its consumer appeal.  If the NCAA and the Ninth Circuit 
majority in O’Bannon are correct, amateurism is like this as well; when  
detached from the product itself, demand has (arguendo) the potential to drop 
to zero. 
However, there is no need to ban commercially produced fruit to ensure 
organic fruit can survive.  The solution is not to let all orchards collude to expel 
any non-organic producers, but rather to establish truth-in-labeling standards.   
This distinction is illustrative for college sports because the concept that 
demand hinges on a magical line across which all demand perishes is similar.  
Almost certainly, the taste buds of organic-seeking consumers would not  
explode if non-organic food crossed their lips, but their demand function might 
collapse.  And so, the legal remedy emerges by which standards are imposed, 
either by law or by voluntary associations of organic growers (playing a role 
much like that of the NCAA) to assure the public that the organic fruit on this 
side of the aisle truly merits the label “organic” while the fruit on side of the 
aisle, without such a sticker, may be cheaper, rosier, etc., but is not organic. 
Under the Rule of Reason, if the organic standards solve an economic  
problem, such that without coordination, the organic fruit market might  
collapse, then this is the quintessence of procompetitiveness.  And to the casual 
observer, the NCAA might seem perfectly analogous to such an organization, 
voluntarily organizing producers of organic or “amateur” products to ensure 
consumers know what they are getting and to let them choose among options, 
secure in the knowledge that their amateur college sports are not really  
professional sports in disguise. 
But this view is incorrect, and it stems from (a) the insistence on a collective 
boycott by the NCAA of any college team that would deviate from the standard 
and (b) the presumption that amateur and college are perfect synonyms and that 
therefore college and professional are perfect antonyms. 
THE NEED FOR STANDARDS IS NOT A NEED FOR BOYCOTTS 
The organic fruit metaphor helps cut through the first issue quite cleanly.  
Organic fruit likely needs a body to inspect and certify the product as truly  
organic.  It does not require a pledge that no supermarket that wishes to sell 
organic fruit also sells non-organic fruit.  It does not impose penalties on those 
                                                          
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
SCHWARZ_VOLANTE FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/15/2016  4:39 PM 
404 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 26:2 
orchards or orchard corporate parents that sell some organic and some  
non-organic fruit.  And it does not prevent orchards that are organic from  
conducting business with those that are not.  But the NCAA does prohibit such 
conduct, so that its rules combine to expel a member from the association,37 to 
terminate all rights and privileges,38 and most egregiously, to mandate a  
collective boycott combined with a mandatory collective boycott by all other 
members, even in a scrimmage or exhibition.39 
A related way to conceptualize the system of compensation cap and  
boycott is that the NCAA and its member schools have created a joint license, 
combining their own intellectual property with that of the players in its  
broadcasts.  The question of a group license was of course central to O’Bannon.  
The district court focused on competition across individual groups and found 
that competition there was unchanged by the creation of a joint license. 
 
While Plaintiffs have shown that the NCAA’s challenged rules 
harm student-athletes by depriving them of compensation that 
they would otherwise receive, they have not shown that this 
harm results from a restraint on competition in the group  
licensing market. In particular, they have failed to show that the 
challenged rules hinder competition among any potential  
buyers or sellers of group licenses.  
 
The sellers in this market would be the student-athletes.  
Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence to show that, in the 
absence of the challenged restraint, teams of student-athletes 
would actually compete against one another to sell their group 
licenses.40 
 
However, in the context of a certification organization, the loss of  
competition driven by the NCAA’s (and its member schools and conferences’) 
                                                          
37. See 2015-16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art 19.9.7 (2015).  “Additional Penalties for Level I 
and Level II Violations. In addition to the core penalties for Level I and Level II violations, the panel 
may prescribe one or more of the following penalties: . . . (e) Recommendation that the institution’s 
membership in the Association be suspended or terminated pursuant to Constitution 3.2.5[.]”  Id. 
38. See id. art 3.2.5.1.1.  “Cessation of Rights and Privileges. All rights and privileges of the member 
shall cease upon any termination or suspension of active membership.” Id. 
39. See id. art 3.2.4.10.  “Discipline of Members. Pursuant to directions of the Board of Directors 
or the annual [Convention], active members shall refrain from athletics competition with designated 
institutions as required under the provisions of the Association’s infractions process (see Bylaw 19).”  
Id. 
40. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 994–95 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
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insistence on exclusivity becomes more apparent.  An instructive analogy can 
be found in the consent decrees established by the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
to govern performing rights organizations (PROs) such as the American Society 
of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP)41 or Broadcast Music, Inc. 
(BMI).42  The decrees encourage competition between the PROs to entice  
licensees and engage new members through the offering of non-exclusive  
licenses—the members maintain the right to individually license their work, 
though not to another PRO. The DOJ felt it necessary to create these decrees 
and subsequent rate systems to protect the artists from the PROs and balance 
the leverage between the parties at the table.  
While not governed by a consent decree like ASCAP and BMI, the  
Society of European Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC) agreed to a  
settlement with the Television Music License Committee (TMLC) worth over 
$58 million to alter its market-restricting conduct.43  The settlement stipulates 
that over the next twenty years, SESAC must offer alternatives to the blanket 
licenses that were only offered previously and allow their affiliates to directly 
enter licensing agreements with local stations, amongst other “forward-looking 
conduct restrictions.”44  
That is, in the case of PROs, the efficiency of creating a bundled license is 
balanced against the anticompetitive side effects that come from the removal of 
competitive offers among members of the group bundle.  Analogously, the  
efficiency involved in conceiving the NCAA as a certification organization is 
the guarantee the NCAA provides that the two teams on the field both meet its 
standards of amateurism so that consumers who value that aspect of the product 
can rest assured they are attending or watching a truly amateur product.   
However, as with the PROs, the line is crossed when the NCAA’s  
collective boycott rules prohibit alternative arrangements from reaching the 
marketplace.  Perhaps fans would relish more opportunities to watch a team of 
college athletes employed by their university play a team of college athletes 
meeting the existing amateurism rules (such as what happens annually when 
                                                          
41. See generally United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 41-1395 
(WCC), 2001 WL 1589999 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001). 
42. See generally United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., No. 64 CIV. 3787, 1994 WL 901652 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994). 
43. Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 650, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
44. Id. at 657–58. 
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Army or Navy45 play Notre Dame),46 but the fact that the NCAA does not allow 
schools other than the military academies to pay their athletes as employees 
prohibits on-the-field and off-the-field competition between these two  
compensation models, a prohibition that is itself prohibited under the ASCAP 
and BMI decrees.  As such, for the NCAA the plausible need for organic fruit 
certification has turned into an unnecessary ban on non-organic fruit. 
COLLEGE AND PROFESSIONAL ARE NOT ANTONYMS 
Thus enters the second source of error—the confusion between college and 
amateur.  College sports would not vanish even if amateur college sports were 
somehow to do so.  As Rascher and Schwarz argued in 2000,47 and Schwarz 
explained in 201148, these terms are not inherently synonymous.  It is easy to 
see that not all amateur sports are collegiate—any youth soccer league fits the 
bill.  It is less common to see paid collegiate sports, but this is because of rules 
                                                          
45. All college athletes at the three military academies (the United States Military Academy at West 
Point, the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, and the United States Air Force Academy at 
Colorado Springs) are employees of their respective branches of the service and receive monthly wages, 
from which deductions are made.  See, e.g., FAQ – Cadet Life, WESTPOINT, http://www.usma.edu/ad-
missions/SitePages/FAQ_Life.aspx (last visited June 9, 2016). 
 
A first-year cadet earns more than $900 a month, and the amount increases each 
year.[]  A portion of that cadet pay is deposited into a personal checking account. An-
other portion of cadet pay is deposited to a “Cadet Account” that is used to help a 
cadet pay for expenses such as uniforms, books, a computer, activity fees, etc. Each 
cadet pays a standard amount for laundry, dry cleaning, haircuts, tailoring services 
and shoe repair.  A cadet’s gross salary is subject to federal and state withholding 
taxes and Social Security deductions. 
 
Id.; see also Cadet Pay, U.S. AIR FORCE ACAD. (Apr. 13, 2009), http://www.usafa.af.mil/AboutUs 
/FactSheets/Display/tabid/1530/Article/428296/cadet-pay.aspx (“U.S. Air Force Academy cadets earn 
$846 a month in basic pay. Cadet pay is disbursed by direct deposit to the cadet’s personal checking 
account.”); Student Life: General Information, USNA, http://www.usna.edu/Student-Life/General-In-
formation-for-Midshipmen.php (last visited June 9, 2016) (explaining that “Midshipmen pay is 
$1027.20 monthly, from which laundry, barber, cobbler, activities fees, yearbook and other service 
charges are deducted. Actual cash pay is $100 per month your first year, which increases each year 
thereafter.”). 
46. This year’s Notre Dame–Navy game was aired on NBC (the broadcast network) on October 10, 
2015.  See C.J. Prosise Scores 3 TDs as No. 15 Notre Dame Beats Navy, ESPN (Oct. 10, 2015), 
http://espn.go.com/college-football/recap?gameId=400763584.  The salaried employees of the Navy 
lost to the unsalaried non-employees of Notre Dame, 24–41.  See id.  Notably, as of November 22, 
2015, this was the Navy’s only loss for the season, but the Authors are unaware of any outrage that paid 
employees are being allowed to compete against more standard amateur athletes.  
47. See generally Rascher & Scwharz, supra note 8. 
48. See generally Andy Schwarz, Excuses, Not Reasons: 13 Myths About (Not) Paying College  
Athletes, SELECTED PROC. SANTA CLARA SPORTS L. SYMP., Sept. 2011, at 46. 
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in question and the NCAA’s grip over intercollegiate sports.  In those rare cases 
where the NCAA does not govern, such as USA Cycling’s (USAC) Collegiate 
Racing, there is no prohibition on professional cyclists participating as long as 
they qualify as bona fide college students.49  USAC rules stipulate only a  
minimum level of funding and do not define or enforce any restriction on  
maximum compensation.50  The primary requirement is simply that the athlete 
actually be in college.51  Schwarz explained that this actually creates four  
possible options, not the false dichotomy of college or professional52: 
 
 Capped In-Kind Payment 
(“Amateur”) 
Market Rate Payment 
(“Professional”) 
College Current NCAA 
Popular 
My proposal   
Likely to be Popular 
Non-Col-
lege 
True Amateurs playing in the 
park, Club Ultimate Frisbee,  
post-collegiate Rugby, etc. 
Not Popular 
NBA D-League and other  
minor leagues. 
 
Not Popular 
 
The NCAA rules defining amateurism may be analogous to the idea of an 
organic fruit certifier, but when the NCAA enforces those rules with economic 
coercion, the analogy breaks down.  If the industry needs a standard to define 
amateurism, and if consumers demand teams that meet that standard, then  
certification is sufficient to ensure their market demand is met.  Instead, the 
actual marketplace sees constant efforts by schools to push beyond those rules 
(which the NCAA tends to call “major infractions”)53 and sees little decrease in 
                                                          
49. See 2012 USA CYCLING RULE BOOK arts 7A1(b), 7G3 (2012).  Collegiate Cycling has a goal 
of “[e]nabling elite riders to pursue an education while benefiting from development opportunities that 
integrate with amateur and professional teams and national development programs[.]”  Id. art 
7A1(b).“Current and former professional cyclists, who otherwise satisfy the eligibility requirements of 
these Rules, are allowed to compete in Collegiate Cycling Races.”  Id. art 7G3. 
50. See id. art 7B1(r). 
Varsity Cycling Team means any USA Cycling Collegiate member club in good standing,  
having submitted the appropriate Varsity application to USA Cycling proving that the Team employs 
or is advised by at least one USAC-licensed coach, and also meets any three of the following four 
requirements: (i) The Team is recognized as holding varsity status by the school with which it is  
affiliated. (ii) The Team disburses at least $10,000 in scholarships to its athletes annually. (iii) The 
Team attended any two of the four USA Cycling Collegiate National Championships in the previous 
calendar year. (iv) The Team pays for Riders’ entry into Collegiate Cycling Races, so long as the  
funding is not derived from team dues of any kind. 
Id.  
51. See id. 
52. Schwarz, supra note 48, at 67. 
53. For a searchable database of these major infractions, see Legislative Services Database - LSDBi, 
NCAA.ORG, https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/miSearch (last visited June 9, 2016). 
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demand with each example.  If consumer demand is truly a function of  
amateurism, then a rigorous standard setting and inspection regime, without the 
need for collective boycott, would suffice.  If there were truly a demand for 
amateurism, then that consumer demand would be sufficient to prevent teams 
from making the “quantum leap” that destroys demand, and the promise of a 
rigorous certification and inspection (but not enforcement) would be all that is 
needed to ensure against market collapse. 
A simple mental experiment makes this clear.  Assume (arguendo) demand 
for Auburn football is, as the majority in the Ninth Circuit implicitly assumed, 
a function of Auburn refraining from crossing some magical line such as COA.  
In other words, assume (as above) that 
𝑑𝐷(𝑤,𝑞)
𝑑𝑤
>0 for all w<=COA, and then 
there is some as-yet unproven discontinuity, such that  𝐷(𝑤, 𝑞) = 0 for all w > 
COA.  As indicated by the functional notation D(w,q), demand is also assumed 
to be a function of quality—that is, the evidence strongly suggests that fans will 
pay more for a winning Auburn Tigers team than a losing one and networks will 
more prominently broadcast winning Auburn games, all else equal.  Now  
assume the NCAA investigates allegations that Cecil Newton, father of 
Heisman Trophy winner Cam Newton, received payment in exchange for his 
son attending Auburn.54  Under the truth-in-labeling assumptions, Auburn 
wants to maintain the label of amateur to tap into consumers’ demand for ama-
teurism, but Auburn also wants to “cheat” by paying the elder Newton for the 
services of the younger to improve quality without seeming to cross the thresh-
old (w>COA).  If the NCAA exposes the payment so that consumers are aware 
that Newton received more than COA, (and if the assumptions about the con-
sumer benefits of amateurism were true) demand for the Auburn product would 
collapse, just as demand for faux-ganic fruit would collapse if the specific 
brands in question were publicly revealed to be phony.55  There is no need to 
fine or collectively boycott Auburn, because if the assumptions about demand 
were true, the market would punish Auburn once the NCAA revealed the truth. 
Instead, as many may have surmised, it is possible the revelation of Cecil 
Newton having profited off the sweat of Cam’s brow would have had little or 
no impact on demand for Auburn football.  That is, it appears that 
𝑑𝐷(𝑤,𝑞)
𝑑𝑤
>0 for 
some values of w>COA, or perhaps even the level of pay has no impact on 
demand, so that D = 𝑓(𝑞), rather than 𝑓(𝑤, 𝑞).56  In that case, if Alabama were 
                                                          
54. Per documents released by Auburn, this example is counter-factual: “The documents indicate 
Newton’s father, Cecil Newton, and ex-Mississippi State player Kenny Rogers sought from $120,000 
to $180,000 for the quarterback to sign with the Bulldogs out of junior college but didn't ask any other 
school for money.” Auburn Releases Cam Newton Docs, ESPN (Nov. 5, 2011), http://espn.go.com/col-
lege-football/story/_/id/7190987/auburn-tigers-records-reveal-details-cam-newton-scandal. 
55. One might say the metaphorical apple would hit Newton on the head. 
56. Indeed, the idea that demand is itself increasing or decreasing in wages is contrary to all  
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to choose (on its own) that it no longer wished to play against Auburn, the  
antitrust laws would have little to say about such unilateral choices.  On the 
other hand, neither would the law prohibit Alabama from continuing to play 
Auburn, even while maintaining amateurism or instead opting to adopt  
payments similar to Auburn.  If it did so, Alabama would be reacting like a 
normal market participant, adopting additional expenses only because it felt it 
would please its fans and thereby grow revenue.  But such broadening of  
consumer choice is made impossible by NCAA rules, which stifle that market 
choice and mandate that Alabama boycott Auburn or else face a collective  
boycott itself. 
In both cases, then, what the law allows—collaboration among competitors 
to ensure a product can exist and thrive—and what the law prohibits—collusion 
above what is reasonable and necessary or which stifles rather than widens  
competition—are a better match to a system in which the NCAA maintains a 
standard definition of amateurism and conducts rigorous audits of schools  
believed to be violating those standards (as it does now) to certify compliance 
of those schools that wish to display the certified amateur sticker, but without 
any enforcement mechanism other than denying that certification to those 
schools that fail to meet the qualifications. 
That is, that the NCAA could continue to define the “molten core” of its  
product as it argued in the Ninth Circuit: “This is the molten core of the rule.  
This says, this is a rule that simply says in the product that we have, athletes 
cannot be paid, and we define what pay constitutes.” 57  But, this would leave it 
to consumers to enforce that rule with their feet (by attending games played only 
by certified amateur teams) and their eyeballs (by watching games played only 
by certified amateur teams). 
In such a system, consumers whose demand is truly driven by amateurism 
will not be fooled into purchasing “shamateur” college football, but those  
consumers for whom such arbitrary distinctions do not matter—much like those 
who are fine with apples grown with pesticides—are able to purchase college 
sports in a market in which restraints on payment (other than those self-enforced 
by demand) do not exist.  In that market, a star athlete might be paid to stay one 
additional year in college rather than ride the pine in the NBA or NFL, but under 
NCAA rules, that choice, for schools and for consumers of those school’s sport 
products, is constrained. 
There was a time during which the NCAA defined amateurism but had no 
                                                          
standard economics.  For the NCAA’s argument to be true, we already have to suppose that demand 
for college sports is sui generis because it hinges on wages in a way normal consumer demand does 
not. 
57. Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 14:23. 
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enforcement power.  From 1906 (when the NCAA was founded) until 1948,58 
the NCAA frequently described the aspirational goal of amateurism as it was 
then defined (no scholarships at all) and left it to schools and conferences to 
enforce such a rule.  Few schools and conferences did, yet the sport thrived.  
Again, in 1951 with the wake of the Sanity Code, the NCAA ceased enforcing 
amateurism but demand remained steady.  
Rather than widening consumer choice, in the way that organic labeling 
rules do, the NCAA’s collective boycott perverts the idea of procompetitive  
restraints by narrowing choice and stifling competition between compensation 
systems.  If the Ninth Circuit, or any court, seeks a truly less restrictive  
alternative to a blanket prohibition on the production of non-amateur college 
sports, a far simpler, far more competitive solution is to allow the NCAA its 
labeling role, but to strip it of enforcement of what amounts to a price-fixing 
cartel (or group boycott). 
In some sense, the debate on a less restrictive alternative, on which  
O'Bannon hinged (and on which Plaintiffs have now appealed) and with which 
Jenkins v. NCAA and Alston v. NCAA also must grapple, is somewhat  
superfluous.59  If the market truly wants amateurism, certified amateur sports 
will sell themselves.  If not, there is no economic justification to allow price-
fixing to achieve such an outcome if the market outcome would be, as the ma-
jority in O’Bannon assumed, one in which athletes capture their full value.  
 
                                                          
58. Note that in oral arguments the NCAA argued that it imposed amateurism from its inception in 
1906.  This is factually false and likely reflects an attempt by the NCAA to push backwards the start of 
its price fixing to make it seem more focal to college sports’ early success than it actually was.   The 
NCAA also failed to note it allows the exceptions for paid employees.  See https://apps.oyez.org 
/player/#/burger8/oral_argument_audio/194259 (last visited June 9, 2016). 
59. See generally Jenkins v. NCAA, 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015). 
